Operational Intelligence by Ronald L Burgess, Paperback | Indigo Chapters

This study investigates the question that if valid operational intelligence is available, are there reasons or factors that preclude it from contributing to or providing operational success? Case studies utilizing intelligence indicators from Pearl Harbor, Midway, and the Battle of the Ardennes are cited for use in the study. Doctrinal requirements from FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, and FM 100-5, Operations, form the basis for the study. The study concludes that operational intelligence indicators were present in all three case studies. The paper presents the case that while Midway is considered an intelligence success and Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes an intelligence failure, the intelligence indicators were present in all three to varying degrees and therefore intelligence should have contributed to operational success. The study identifies six shortcomings that were present and caused the intelligence indicators not to be acted upon. These shortcomings are too much intelligence or the \"noise\" theory, preconceived ideas, overconfidence, desire for certainty, \"wolf\" theory, and systematic and intrinsic problems of intelligence system. The study concludes that there is an interrelationship among the shortcomings and that if one shortcoming is allowed to manifest itself then another normally follows. When operational intelligence is high in quality and adequate in the amount of detail required, the commander has greater freedom of action in his planning spectrum. Operational intelligence can allow the commander to increase his agility and synchronization, take full advantage of his depth, and allow initiative to be on his side. | Operational Intelligence by Ronald L Burgess, Paperback | Indigo Chapters